
## Soviet Forces and Capabilities in the Northwestern Theater of Military Operations

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Interagency Intelligence Memorandum



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| NI IIM 88-10001CX  SOVIET FORCES AND CAPABILITIES IN THE NORTHWESTERN THEATER   | zed Copy Approved for Rel |  | ,<br>] .   | 25         |
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|                    | SCOPE NOTE  |               |
|                    | This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum examines Soviet  | •             |
|                    | naval, air, air defense, and ground forces that are expected to be active   |               |
|                    | in the event of war in the Northwestern Theater of Military Operations  |               |
|                    | (TMO), assesses their capability to conduct wartime operations, and   |               |
| •                  | estimates how the Soviets would try to deploy and use them. The timeframe for this Memorandum corresponds to the force projections in   |               |
|                    | NIE 11-14-85, Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater  |               |
|                    | Forces, 1985-2000. The projections herein represent the Intelligence  |               |
|                    | Community's analysis of the likely outcome of the USSR's general  |               |
|                    | purpose forces development. Near-term projections (through 1990) are  |               |
|                    | based on events now occurring in the forces. Mid-term (through 1995) and long-term (through 2000) estimates are based on Soviet weapons |               |
|                    | now under development, anticipated changes in rates of production,  |               |
|                    | and an assessment of the likely results of current Soviet research and de-  |               |
|                    | velopment efforts. There is less confidence in the accuracy of our long-  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|                    | term projections.   | 23/1          |
|                    | This Memorandum has been coordinated with the Central Intelli-<br>gence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security  |               |
|                    | Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Marine Corps and the  |               |
|                    | Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force.  | 25 <b>X</b> 1 |
|                    | This Memorandum was produced under the auspices of the  |               |
|                    | National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces  | 25X1          |
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Figure 1 Selected Soviet Force Headquarters in the Northwestern TMO



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| KEY JUDGMENTS   |    |
|---|----|
| The northern region of Europe is viewed by the Soviet leadership as a vital area within which several strategic operations would take place in the event of war. Soviet forces in the Northwestern Theater of Military Operations (TMO) are organized for a variety of missions:  |    |
| — Defense against NATO air-, sea-, and land-based nuclear and conventional strikes directed at those Soviet strategic forces located in the region. A primary objective of Soviet forces stationed in the Northwestern TMO is to protect Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine forces (and their support facilities) operating in Northern Fleet waters. |    |
| — Defense against strategic offensives into the depth of the Soviet<br>homeland through this theater. Soviet naval, air, and air defense<br>forces in the Northwestern TMO are intended to defend against<br>NATO carrier-based air forces, as well as sea- and air-launched<br>cruise missiles.  |    |
| — The generation of ground, air defense, air, and naval forces to<br>undertake operations in the Barents and Norwegian Seas and in<br>Finland and Norway. A primary Soviet objective in this theater<br>is to gain control of facilities of northern Norway, particularly<br>airfields and local ports.   |    |
| We judge <i>frontal</i> <sup>1</sup> operations in the Northwestern TMO to be secondary to those of the Western TMO in Soviet planning.   |    |
| The USSR intends to use facilities in Finland for operations against Norway. Although we believe the Soviets would be reluctant to widen a conflict in Scandinavia by an unprovoked attack on Sweden, they would probably include Swedish airspace in their air defense umbrella.   |    |
| Although the Northern Fleet is the most powerful of the Soviet fleets—with 60 percent of the strategic submarine force—not all of the naval forces assigned to this fleet are intended to operate within the Northwestern TMO. Soviet naval operations within this theater will   |    |
| focus on direct support to ground forces operations, support to the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force, strikes against Western naval forces, and coastal defense. We estimate that the USSR will  |    |
| Although not directly comparable to any Western organization, a front would be similar to a NATO army group and its associated air forces in size, level of command, and function. There is no standard organization for a front. This term will be italicized throughout the Memorandum.   | 25 |
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|                        | engage in offensive mining op<br>also expect the Northern Fle<br>during the next 10 years.   |  |   |                       |
|                        | Soviet ground forces in steady improvement since the their equipment and training environment of this theater operations would require a lend include moving the majority Peninsula.   | ng to the requirements of<br>. Nonetheless, major offer<br>ngthy force generation proces   | nave tailored  the severe asive ground ss that would                                |                       |
|                        | The counter-air operation the Soviet forces in the North cantly improved air defense in forces within the TMO, by in to-air missiles into the air definidair refueling capabilities for rating warning and control air viets have also improved their airfields. | this theater by integrating a<br>troducing the latest aircraft<br>ense forces of the theater, b<br>for their newest fighters, and<br>craft into their air defense fo | have signifi- ll air defense and surface- y developing l by incorpo- orces. The So- |                       |
|                        | For the present within the tions would most likely be distant an Independent Air Defense another at Arkhangel'sk are used.   | Army headquartered at Le   | For example,<br>eningrad and  |                       |
| ,                      | The correlation of nuclear TMO is in the Soviets' fav  | ar and chemical forces in the  | e Northwest-  | 25X1                  |
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